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GOD AS TRUTH
John Peterson

The view of Aristotle and Brentano that 'true' applies straightforwardly to
statements (judgments, beliefs, propositions) and derivatively to other things
makes for awkward and unintuitive definitions in the cases of derived truth.
This is corrected by construing 'true' as applying analogically to statements
and other things. Under this view, six senses of 'true' are distinguished.
Following the logic of analogy, these senses are partly the same and partly
different. These six senses also exhibit an analogy of proportionality. This
yields three groups, paired as follows: moral truth is to sentenial truth as
productive truth is to ontological truth as cultural truth is to lawful truth.
But behind every analogical prediction is a derivative predication. This
implies that there is a primary referent of 'true' behind moral, productive and
cultural truth on the one hand and sentential, ontological and lawful truth on
the other. In the case of the former three, it is evidently the human mind. In
the case of the latter three, a reasonable hypothesis, shared by Aquinas, is that
it is God's mind.

Many philosophers hold that being true is a relation of correspondence,
conformity or agreement between thought and reality. If and only if it is a
fact that grass is green is the proposition (judgment, statement, belief) that
grass is green true. But though they agree in this, they differ both as to the
terms of that relation and as to the nature of the relation itself. And so
their agreement is often vacuous. Some, like Aquinas and Locke, construe
the thought that conforms to reality as a mental sign, an ens rationis. Wary
of psychologism, others, like Frege, identify thought with object of thought
as opposed to any mental entity. Still others, like Quine, Strawson and
many contemporary philosophers, identify thought here with either a sentence or the assertive use of a sentence.
There is also disagreement about the other end of the relation, reality.
Often it is identified with a fact. But even here there is difference. Logical
atomists, for instance, say that, like the simple statements that express
them, elementary or atomic facts live in splendid isolation. Opposing this
atomism, holists claim that anyone fact is made what it is by its relation to
every other fact. That means that, taken in and of itself, the isolated fact
that makes thought true is partial reality and hence that the thought in
question is true only to a degree. Thus, while Truth with a capital 'T' is
identified with the whole of reality ("Die Wahrheit ist das ganze," says
Hegel), a thought's being (to a degree) true is a matter of its conforming to
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some partial reality.
But despite these as well as other differences, most agree that to say
thought is true is to say it corresponds to reality. Truth is said to be a relation between two things and not either a thing itself or some quality or
attribute of a thing.
In what follows it is argued that this relational view of truth confuses an
effect of truth with the definition of truth. Where there is truth there is correspondence of thought and reality and vice versa. Thus, truth is equivalent
to a relation of correspondence. But from this it does not follow nor is it
the case that truth is defined in terms of that relation. By analogy, where
there are persons there is the capacity to laugh and vice versa. But the
capacity to laugh does not enter into the definition of a person. It is the
effect of the definition of a person as a rational animal. Truth is found primarily not in the conformity of thought and reality but in the ultimate
source or measure of that conformity. That means that, in relation to that
source, propositions (judgments, statements, beliefs) are called true in a
derived sense. They are not strictly speaking true but are called true
because they conform to truth. In this they are analogous to blood samples. The latter are not themselves healthy but are called healthy only
because they are the effect of health. As it is the source of healthy blood, an
animal, in which health is properly and primarily found, so too it is the
ultimate source or measure of true propositions (and other things) in
which truth is primarily found. And this source or measure, at least so far
as non-human truth is concerned, is God. In this way, truth follows being.
A thing has truth in the same way it has being, say Aristotle and Aquinas. 1
As things other than God are said to be only because being is first found in
God, things other than God are called true only because truth is first found
in God.
When propositions and other things are called true because they conform to truth, there are in this relation of conformity two things. There is
that which conforms, x, and that to which it conforms, y. And there is that
feature or state in respect to which x conforms to y, call it F. What I contend is that truth is found by priority in y and in a posterior way in x.
Moreover, the relation between x and y is always one of composite to simple. What conforms, x, is always some instantiation of F. It is the complex
of F-as-embodied-in-something. But that to which x conforms, y, is, in relation to x, something simple. It is not F as instantiated in things but F considered apart from things in mind as ideal standard or measure.
I

'True' is said to apply primarily to statements (judgments, beliefs,
propositions) and secondarily to everything else. Since the latter are not
straightforwardly called true but are called true only by reference to true
statements, to which they bear some relation, 'true' is said to be predicated
of these non-statements in a derived or pros hen sense. Originating in
Aristotle and reinforced in modern times bv Brentand, this view may be
called the reductionist view of 'true' (hereafter, RV). Modern logicians ~ho
flaunt their disagreement with Aristotle on matters like the square of oppo-
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sition and existential import join hands with The Philosopher when it
comes to accepting RV.
Under RV all metaphysical, epistemological or ethical senses of 'true'
are derived from and hence reduced to the logical sense of 'true.' This elevates logic and diminishes metaphysics in the sense that being is only elliptically said to be true in the classic scholastic formula that being is one, true
and good. It also excludes any irreducible ethical truth such as
Kierkegaard's subjective truth. For under RV when it is said that a person's life or actions exemplify truth or that he or she lives and moves in the
truth 'truth' must always be used in an extended sense. Further, when in
epistemic context ideas, concepts, beliefs, judgments or other entia ration is
are called true, it is once again assumed, following RV, that 'true' is predicated derivatively of these entities. This is reinforced by the specter of psychologism. Lest they invite this error, philosophers eschew predicating
'true' straightforwardly of ideas, judgments, beliefs or any other mental
acts or entities. So when it comes to truth, metaphysics, ethics and epistemology borrow from logic. Their use of 'truth' and 'true' is always
derived. In every case it comes with a string attached and on the other end
of the string is the narrowly logical sense of 'true.'
To spell out RV, consider first the definition of derivative or pros hen
predication.
OP
For any predicate G, G is attributed to something derivatively or
pros hen just when the sense of G is different from, but nonetheless includes, both the primary sense and referent of G.
Expressions like 'false gold' or 'true diamond' exemplify OF. Under RV
and OP, iron pyrite, for example, is called false gold only because it gives
rise to a statement that fails to correspond to reality, i.e., 'This is gold.' And
something is called a true diamond only because it gives rise to a statement
that does correspond to reality, i.e., 'This is a diamond.' Following tradition, let us call those cases in which 'true' is applied to things like gold
nuggets and diamonds ontological truth (OT).
Note that OT refers not only to natural things but also to natural
processes. Surveying his wheat crop in a normal season, a farmer says that
its course is true. By this he means that, unless something unexpected happens, the crop will reach its natural final end. Gynecologists likewise speak
of the development of a fetus as being uneventful or true to course. Under
RV, the course of the crop or the fetus is called true only in a derived sense,
i.e., only because it is the ground of the true statement, "The crop (or fetus)
is on target." This derived, teleological sense of 'true' as applied to natural
events also appears in language describing non-natural events. These are
events that are initiated by us. When we think it will strike its target, we
say of an arrow or golf ball that its course is true. And assuming RV and
OP, the arrow or ball's flight is so characterized only because it is the
ground of the true statement, "The arrow (or ball) is on target."
But focusing on OT, we can say that this secondary sense of 'true' exemplifies OP. For the sense of 'true' here includes both the primary sense and
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referent of 'true.' And so we can call cases in which 'true' is (secondarily)
predicated of natural things and processes ontological truth (OT) and cases
in which 'true' is (primarily) predicated of statements (judgments, propositions) sentential truth (ST). Thus we have,
ST
A statement t is true just when t corresponds to reality.
OT
A natural thing or process n is called true only because n is the
ground of the correspondence of a statement about n to reality.
If OP is assumed, it is evident that all predications in OT are derivative.
They are secondary senses of 'true' which are derivative of ST the primary
sense of 'true.' For though the sense of OT is different from that of ST, the
sense of OT includes both the primary sense and referent of ST.
Other examples show what derivative predication comes to. Suppose a
person and an event are called sad. It is evident that the former is called
sad in the primary sense of the term and the latter is called sad in a derived
or secondary sense. As predicated of a person, 'sad' means, "being in a
state of dejection" but as predicated of an event 'sad' means, "conducive to
a person's being in a state of dejection." Again, suppose an animal and
blood are called healthy. The former is so called in the primary sense of
the term and the latter is called healthy in a secondary sense of the term.
As predicated of an animal 'healthy' means, "being in a state of physical
well-being," while, as predicated of blood, 'healthy' means, "being a sign
of an animal being in a state of physical well-being." These examples follow OP. Both the primary sense and referent of 'sad' and 'healthy' are
included, respectively, in the secondary senses of 'sad' and 'healthy.'
As 'sad' in 'sad event' and 'healthy' in 'healthy blood' exemplify OP, so
too, apparently, does ~T. For it can be said that what is meant by calling
something true gold is that it "gives rise to a statement (e.g., 'This is gold')
that corresponds to reality." So it in ST, its primary sense, 'true' means
"corresponds to reality," then it is evident that "gives rise to a statement
that corresponds to reality" includes both the primary sense and referent
of 'true.' Therefore, no less than with 'sad event' and 'healthy blood' in
relation to 'sad' and 'healthy/ respectively, 'true gold/ 'true diamond,'
and all other instances of OT in relation to 'true' exemplify OP, given the
assumption of RV.
But besides OT, other supposed secondary senses of 'true' may be distinguished. That means that, if RV is true, the latter must also be derivative
of ST and so exemplify OP. Otherwise, RV must be abandoned. These
other senses of 'true' include moral truth (MT), productive truth (PT), cultural truth (CT) and lawful truth (LT). I consider MT first.
MT involves the conformity of a person's statement to his or her own
beliefs. A celebrated example of moral falsity is Pablo's lie in Sartre's The
Wall.' There Pablo tells the falangists that Ramon Gris is hiding in the
gravedigger's shack, even though Pablo disbelieves this is so. He deliberately misleads the falangists in order to laugh at them as they scurry to the
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shack to capture Gris. But as the story goes, it turns out that Gris is in the
gravedigger's shack. Pablo's statement is thus both true in the primary
sense and false in a secondary sense. Though it is ST true, it is MT false.
For what Pablo says fails to conform to what he believes.
A similar case is one in which one's statement fails to correspond both
to reality and to one's knowledge. Suppose I am not in pain but to gain
some advantage say that I am in pain. My statement is then both ST and
MT false. The difference between this case and the case of belief is that in
the case of knowledge a statement that conforms to my knowledge that P
must also conform to reality while a statement that conforms to one of my
beliefs may not conform to reality. And this is because knowledge but not
belief entails truth.
In any case, if MT is a secondary, derived sense of 'true,' then, by DP, the
primary sense and referent of 'true' are included in the sense of MT. And a
case can be made for this. To call a person's statement MT true is to say that
it corresponds to the person's belief that what the statement in question
expresses corresponds to reality. Thus we get, assuming RV and DP,
MT
A statement t of a person s is called true only because t expresses
s's belief that t corresponds to reality.
In the example cited, Pablo's statement that Gris is in the gravedigger's
shack fails to satisfy MT. For contravening MT, Pablo's statement does not
express a belief on Pablo's part that this statement corresponds to reality.
Examples aside, note that MT follows OT in exemplifying DP. The sense
of MT, just like the sense of OT, includes both the primary sense and referent of 'true.' This shows that, just as is the case in OT, a case can be made
for saying that MT is derivative of ST.
Next, consider PT. PT involves the conformity of a product or humaninitiated process to the producer's conceptual model or know-how. It
includes all arts, crafts, and skills. A sculptor who is disappointed in the
cut of his statue may try again, calling his first attempt a false start and his
second effort "the true one." He knows the first try falls short of his ideal.
Or suppose a singer knows the song she sings does not measure up to her
ability to sing the song. She may then break it off, informing her accompanist that she made a false start. If PT is derivative of ST, then, by DP, the
primary sense and referent of ST are included in the sense of PT. And once
again, a case can be made for this. For it may be said that to call a certain
artefact PT true is to say that it is the ground of the correspondence of the
artisan's statement, "This corresponds to my ideal model," to reality.
Assuming RV and DP, we then get,
PT
A product or performance r of an artisan s is called true only
because r is the ground of the correspondence of the statement,
r conforms to s's ideal model," to reality.
/l

And here it is clear that, for the third time and following DP, the prima-
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ry sense and referent of 'true' are included in one of the secondary, derived
senses of 'true.' PT is different from but nonetheless includes the primary
sense and referent of ST.
Still further, there is what may be called cultural truth (CT). This involves
the conformity of a person's behavior to some custom or law of society.
Stopping at a red traffic light conforms to the law to that effect in our society. But the conforming action in cultural truth need not be legal. It may be
customary only. Thus, my shaking hands with the person to whom I am
introduced conforms to a long-standing custom in our society. All forms of
what is currently referred to as "political correctness" fall under this heading. Under the assumption of RV and DP we then get the following:
CT
An action c of a person s is called true only because c is the
ground of the correspondence of the statement, "c conforms to a
law or custom of the society to which s belongs," to reality.
As it is with aT, MT, and PT, so is it with CT, at least if DP and RV are
assumed. That is to say, the sense of CT includes both the primary sense
and referent of ST.
Finally, there is what was previously called lawful truth (LT). This is the
conformity of events or activities to some non-societal or objective law.
Thus, we say that the free fall of an object conforms to Galileo's law of
acceleration or that an observed expansion of gas exemplifies Boyle's law.
Before modern science (as for example, with the scholastics) natural laws
are construed teleologically. For example, the activities in a tadpole are
directed to their end, the mature frog, by the law of its nature. At each
stage in the tadpole's development it is said that the changes that occur in
the tadpole are "true to" the law of its nature. On the other hand, an errant
event is one that is not true to law. In Epicurus' system, for example, certain atoms are not true to the law of atomic motion just because they
swerve. Nor is LT necessarily confined to science or philosophy of nature.
Just in case there are objective moral laws, a person's behavior may be
characterized as being ethically true, i.e., true or correct because it conforms to objective moral law. And so, once again under the assumption of
RV and Dr, we get the following:
LT
An activity y, is called true only because y is the ground of the
correspondence of the statement, "y conforms to an objective
law," to reality.
II

aT, MT, PT, CT and LT are noticeably contrived. In the case of aT, it is
more straightforward to call natural things and processes true simply
because they conform to some pattern. As for PT, it is more natural to
define a true artefact as one that conforms to the artist's ideal model. In the
case of MT, it is easier to define a (morally) true statement simply as one
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that conforms to the stater's beliefs. And as regards CT, it is simpler to
define true or correct actions as those that conform to some law or custom.
And as for LT, it is more straightforward to call lawlike events true because
they conform to law. The appeal of these cleaner definitions casts suspicion
on what spawns the prolixity of OT, MT, PT, CT and LT to begin with,
namely, RV. This calls for an alternative to RV.
One such alternative is this. Instead of construing aT, MT, PT, CT and
LT as secondary senses of 'true' that have been derived from ST, the primary sense, let us divide the six senses into two pairs, MT', PT' and CT' on one
side and ST', aT' and LT' on the other. Note the advantage that these definitions hold over their foregoing counterparts so far as simplicity goes. Thus,
MT'
One's statement is true just when it conforms to one's beliefs.
PT'
A human product or performance is true just when it conforms
to the maker's or doer's ideal.
CT'
One's action is true just when it conforms to a custom
or law of one's society.
ST'
A statement is true just when it conforms to a fact.
aT'
A natural thing or process is true just because it conforms to its
model.
LT'
An activity is true just when it conforms to objective law.
MT', PT' and CT' form one group and ST', aT' and LT' make up the
other. The division turns on whether the measure of the conformity always
depends on us or not. In the first group, we are the measure in every case
while in the second group the measure is almost always independent of us.
It may for that reason be said that MT', PT' and CT' are subjective while
ST', aT' and LT' are objective.
In MT' the measure or standard of the conformity is a belief and a belief
depends on us. When I assert that P, this is MT' true provided that I
believe P, regardless of whether or not P squares with reality. But ordinarily, P is ST' true provided that P conforms to a fact, regardless of whether
anyone believes P or not. The exception is a statement like, 'I believe it is
raining.' Since this statement is ST' true provided that I believe it is raining, the measure here does depend on us. Succinctly, the difference
between MT' and ST' truth comes to this: when I assert that P, this is MT'
true iff I believe P; it is ST' true iff P. Thus, when I say 'It is raining' this is
MT' true iff I believe it is raining; it is ST' true if it is raining. So if I say 'I

GOD AS TRUTH

349

believe it is raining' this is MT' true iff I believe that I believe it is raining;
it is ST' true iff I believe it is raining:
In PT' the measure of the conformity is a pattern in the mind of the
maker or doer. So PT' truth again depends on us. In the previous example,
our disappointed sculptor abandons his first try and begins anew, hoping
that his second start will conform to his ideal pattern. But in the counterpart of PT', namely, OT', a natural thing conforms to its pattern, and so is
true, regardless of whether or not it jibes with any artist's model.
As for CT', since the measure of the conformity here is a conventional
law or custom, CT' truth also depends on us. To the extent that I slow
down when approaching a reduced speed area, my action is correct in the
sense of being true to, or conforming to, the law. But in LT', the counterpart of CT', the behavior of my vehicle conforms or is true to the laws of
physics regardless of whether or not it conforms or is true to the laws of
trafficking. Depending on how fast I drive, the distance I must cover before
reaching the lower speed limit may or may not coincide with the area of
reduced speed. And so, while the measure in PT' and CT' always depends
on us, the measure in their counterparts, OT' and LT', never depends on us.
So between each member in the first group of three and its corresponding member in the second group of three an analogy of proportionality
obtains. Thus, MT' is to ST' as PT' is to OT' as CT' is to LT'. In each one of
these three pairs, truth is measure of something else. That is the element of
identity in the analogy. But the difference is that the type of measure varies
in the three pairs. In MT' and ST', truth is measure in the sense of ground of
what is said. Morally speaking, since Pablo disbelieves his own statement
that Gris is hiding in the gravedigger's shack, his statement is morally
false. Yet, since his statement conforms to reality, it is sententially true. In
PT' and OT' truth is measure in the sense of a pattern after which something is
made. Just in case Michaelangelo's Pieta conforms to his ideal model, it is
artistically true. And because the rock out of which the Pieta is hewn is
really marble and not some imitation, the Pieta qua natural object (as
opposed to qua artefact) conforms to the Idea of marble. And just to that
extent is it ontologically true. Finally, in CT' and LT' truth is measure in
the sense of a rule or law according to which something occurs. Just to the
extent that my son's behavior at dinner finally conforms to the rules of
American etiquette, it is culturally true or correct behavior. And just to the
extent that the rock I drop accelerates at thirty-two feet per second per second, the behavior of the rock is true to Galileo's law of free fall.
In any event, the analogy of proportionality that holds between MT'
and ST', PT' and OT' and CT' and LT' implies a narrower analogy of attribution between the first member of anyone of these three pairs and the
first member of any other pair. In MT' and PT' 'true' applies partly in the
same sense and partly in a different sense. The sameness consists in the
idea of conformity to a measure. But the difference comes from the nonidentity of the terms of that relation in each case. In MT' they are statements and beliefs while in PT' they are products (or performances) and
models. But words that are used partly in the same sense and partly in a
different sense are used analogically and not either univocally, equivocally
or derivatively. For terms apply univocally only when they are used in
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exactly the same sense; they apply equivocally only when they are used in
totally different senses; and they apply derivatively only when there is a
primary sense and referent from which all other senses are derived. But
since 'true' in MT' and PT' fails to apply either exactly in the same sense or
in totally different senses, 'true' applies here neither univocally nor equivocally. Nor does 'true' in these same two senses apply derivatively.
Otherwise, under DP, the (primary) sense and referent of 'true' in one of
these two definitions are included in the other. But this is not the case. It
follows that in MT' and PT' 'true' applies analogically. And it is evident
that the same analysis applies, mutatis mutalldis, to MT' and CT' on the one
hand and to PT' and CT' on the other.
III

But the analysis is thus far incomplete. For consider the following principle which may be called the principle of analogy (PA):
PA
For any predicate G, G is analogically predicated of a and b only
because G is derivatively predicated of a and b by reference to c,
of which G is primarily predicated and which is the measure of
G ina and b.
Examples bring out the thrust of P A. As predicated of the accidents of
quality and activity, 'being' is used partly in the same sense and partly in a
different sense. Though they are evidently different, the categories of quality and activity are also the same. They are both accidents. So 'being' is
said of quality and activity analogically. But qualities and activities are
analogically called beings only because they both depend on some other
thing that is in the primary sense being, namely, substance. In other words,
the only reason why being' is predicated analogically of quality and activity is that being' applies derivatively to quality and activity by reference to
a third thing, substance, of which 'being' is primarily predicated. This
unpacks the meaning of P A.
Once again, health and wealth are called good partly in the same sense
and partly in a different sense. As for sameness, they are both called good
because they can be conducive to what is good in itself, namely, happiness.
But since, when they are conducive to happiness, health and wealth are conducive to it in different ways, they are called good in a different sense. Here
again, PA is exemplified. For 'good' is attributed analogically to health and
wealth only because 'good' applies derivatively to health and wealth when
these are taken in relation to what is primarily good, namely, happiness.
Moreover, to the extent that they are good, health and wealth depend
on happiness just as, to the extent that they are being, qualities and activities depend on substance. Some persons are made unhappy by wealth and
even by health. Wealth can cause anxiety and health, as Kant observes/
can cause pride and arrogance. But pride and arrogance work against happiness. In these cases no one calls wealth or health good. This dependence
of analogates on their ground is shown by another example. Blood and
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urine are analogically called healthy because 'healthy' is predicated of
blood and urine partly in the same sense and partly in a different sense.
The sameness consists in their being signs of health in an animal while the
difference consists in their being signs of health in a specific bodily system.
But note that, here too, the analogates, blood and urine, depend for their
existence on what grounds the analogy and is the primary referent of
'healthy,' namely, an animal.
But analogates depend on their ground logically as well as really, for
their essence as well as for their existence. For the ground of an analogy is
included in its analogates. You cannot define an analogate without including its ground in the definition. This is borne out in our examples. Qualities
and activities cannot exist apart from substance. So they really depend on
substance. But this is because they logically depend on substance. For substance enters into the definition of quality and activity as it enters into the
definition of any accident. Again, since, when they are good, health and
wealth cannot exist without happiness, health and wealth, when good,
really depend on happiness. They are found only in a happy person. But
this is because happiness is included in their respective definitions. For
what is meant by calling health and wealth good is just that they are conducive to happiness. Finally, blood and urine really depend on an animal.
They do not exist without animals. But this is once again due to their conceptual dependence on animal. You cannot define blood or urine without
including animal in the definition.
Generalizing on these examples, it may now be said that in PA above,
a and b always both really and logically depend on c, the primary referent of G. Thus,
PA'
When G is predicated analogically of a and b, there is a thing c
such that, i), c is the primary referent of G, ii), c is the measure of
G in a and b and iii), a and b really and logically depend on c.
Armed with P A and PA', let us return to truth. As it is with 'being,'
'good' and 'healthy' in the foregoing examples, so is it with 'true' in, say,
MT', PT' and CT'. Under PA, 'true' is attributed analogically to statements,
artistic productions and conventional behavior in MT', PT' and CT' respectively only because they depend on some fourth thing for being called true.
And due to this dependency, truth is found primarily in this fourth thing
and derivatively in them.
Here, we are the fourth thing. It is human beings that are the measure
of truth in these three things. Though not in the sense that Kierkegaard
means it, this may be called the domain of subjective truth. A statement is
called morally true only because it conforms to human intellect as believing; artefacts are called true only because they conform to human intellect
as modeling; and conventional behavior is called true because it conforms
to human intellect as legislating. In all three cases, 'true' applies to statements, artefacts and behavior analogously only because 'true' applies
derivatively to these things taken in relation to a fourth thing in which
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truth is primarily found. And this fourth thing is evidently a human intellect. Thus, my son's polite behavior is true or correct derivatively speaking,
i.e., only because it conforms to truth. And the truth to which it conforms is
intellect qua maker of societal rules.
But PA' is also exemplified in these three cases. The three analogates
really and logically depend on our intellect in which truth is here primarily
found. That is how PA' adds to PA and it is expressed in P A' iii) above. In
all three cases, the analogate is something measured that really and logically depends on its measure, intellect. It is our intellect that makes the
beliefs, models and rules that enter into the definition of statements, artefacts and conventional behavior, respectively.
Thus, following DP or the logic derivative predication, it can be said
that, when something is MT', PT' or CT' true, truth is found primarily in
intellect and only secondarily in the statements, artefacts and human
action, respectively, that conform to intellect. In MT' statements are called
true only because they conform to truth in intellect; in PT' artefacts are
called true only because they conform to truth in intellect; and in CT'
human acts are called true only because, once again, they conform to truth
in intellect. It is because truth is found primordially in intellect (as measure) that something is called true because it conforms to intellect as measure. The only difference is that the specific intellectual measure is different
in each case. It is beliefs in MT' truth, ideal models in PT' truth and conventional rules in CT' truth. So in the cases of MT', PT' and CT' truth, what
is behind the analogical predication of 'true' of statements, artefacts and
conventional behavior, i.e., intellect, is a unity-in-difference that comprises
beliefs, Ideas and rules, respectively.
One more thing must be said about MT', PT' and CT'. The ideal pattern
that is conformed to in each case is final cause with respect to what conforms to it. And to the extent that it is, subjective truth is always teleological. In PT' truth, the ideal model in the articifer's mind is that for the sake of
which he constructs or performs; in CT' truth, a rule of etiquette, say, that I
bear in mind is what I aim to fulfill when I hold a swinging door for an
oncoming person; and in MT' truth, disclosure of a belief in my mind is
that for the sake of which I speak or write.

IV
It remains only to identify the fourth thing behind the analogical use of
'true' in ST', OT' and LT'. If it is our intellect that is behind the analogical
use of 'true' in MT', PT' and CT', what is behind the same use of 'true' in
ST', OT' and LT'? If it is our intellect that is the ground of subjective truth,
what is the ground of objective truth? Assuming PA once again, there must
here be a single fourth thing that is ground of the truth of the three ana10gates in this case, i.e., statements, natural things and events, just as our
mind is ground of the truth of statements, artefacts and conventional
behavior. And it is this fourth thing, and not the statements, natural things
and events that in this non-human truth conform to it, that is strictly speaking true. Thus, no less than statements, artefacts and human acts in MT',
PT' and CT', statements, natural things and events in ST', OT' and LT' are
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called true in a secondary, derived sense of the term. For since 'true'
applies analogically to these three things, then, going by P A, truth is primarily found not in these three analogates but in the ground or measure of
the analogy. And going by PA', the three analogates in this case, just like
the three analogates in the case of subjective truth, both really and logically
depend for their truth on this same source or measure of their truth. But
that means that this fourth thing enters into the definitions of statements,
natural things and events just as, in subjective truth, our intellect enters
into the definitions of statements, artefacts and conventional behavior. But
the fourth thing here in objective truth is no undifferentiated measure any
more than it is in subjective truth. It is once again a unity-in-difference. For
what enters into the definitions of statements, things and events as their
respective measures are truths, Ideas and laws, respectively. And these are
many kinds of measures. But since, under PA, the fourth thing or ground of
analogy is one thing, it follows once again that the fourth thing is a one-inmany, a single thing that comprises three kinds of archetypes as measures.
Stated differently, though by PA our fourth thing here is aile thing, it must
none the less be sufficiently diversified to accommodate conformity to it on
the part of three different things, i.e., statements, things and events. The one
measure of truth has three dimensions that make conformity to it on the part
of the three different analogates possible. Thus, statements are called true
because they conforn1 to truth-measure as timeless fact, things are called true
because they conform to truth-measure as eternal Idea and events are called
true because they conform to truth-measure as transcendent law. It is the
same, we saw, with subjective truth. There, statements are called true
because they conform to truth-measure as belief, artefacts are called true
because they conform to truth-measure as model and action is called true
because it conforms to truth-measure as societal rule. So the measure here in
objective truth is once again a multi-sided oneness, a unity-in-difference.
It is evident that the fourth thing is not this time our mind. The analogates in this case, i.e., statements, natural things and events, are not called
true because they conform to truth in our intellect. Otherwise, no account
is given of the fact that ST', OT' and LT' truth is called objective while MT',
PT' and CT' truth is called subjective. It is also evident that the fourth thing
here in objective truth is not caused by something else. Otherwise, it is
measured being and not the measure of being. But then, assuming that
something is true to the extent that it has being, the fourth thing is true
only in a derived sense just like the statements, natural things and events
whose truth it supposedly measures. And then the search for the ground of
truth continues. So the question is this. What is the ground or fourth thing
behind statements, natural things and events, all of which are objectively, if
analogically, called true, as we are the ground or fourth thing behind statements, artefacts and conventional behavior, all of which are subjectively, if
analogically, called true?
Ultimates like Spinoza's Substance or Hegel's Absolute serve as prima
facie candidates for this ground. For one thing, they are independent of
human minds. For another, their manifestations both really and logically
depend on them. For a third, they are measure and not measured. In
Spinoza, modes, whether finite or infinite, mediate or immediate, cannot
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exist without Substance. Since they exist only as modifications of
Substance, they really depend on Substance. Also, Substance is for its part
included in modes. You cannot define mode without including Substance
in the definition, says Spinoza. So modes logically depend on Substance.
The same goes for the relation of the Absolute to its moments in Hege1. 6
Finite moments really depend on the Absolute and the Absolute is included in the definition of its finite moments. When he calls the victorious
Napoleon the World Spirit "riding through the city," Hegel turns no
metaphor.? He really means that The World Spirit lives and moves in the
first Emperor of France. And it is important to see that this World Spirit,
like Spinoza's Substance, is no transcendent entity, lying beyond sense perception. Platonic metaphysicians Spinoza and Hegel are not.
But closer inspection excludes these candidates. These ultimates are not
just inclusive unities but all-inclusive unities. But if the fourth thing by reference to which statements, natural things and events in ST', OT' and LT' are
called true is their measure, it evidently does not include them, the measured.
Otherwise, the measured is explained in terms of itself, making a perfect circle. But an all-inclusive ultimate either includes statements, natural things
and events or is not all-inclusive. No all-inclusive ultimate is a measure with
respect to the measured any more than it is creator with respect to the created. Either designation implies dualism and dualism is incompatible with any
all-inclusive ultimate. But the fourth thing that is here sought is the measure
of the truth of statements, natural things and events. Therefore, it cannot be
said that the fourth thing behind the truth of statements, natural things and
events in ST', OT' and LT' is some all-inclusive ultimate.
What is required, then, is an ultimate that, while it is not the whole-ofreality, is nonetheless like the all-inclusive ultimates of philosophers like
Hegel and Spinoza in being a unity-in-difference. For though it is one, it
must have many aspects to make conformity to it on the part of the three
very different analogates possible.
That excludes the One of either Parmenides or Plotinus, Plato's Form of
the Good and Plotinus' Nous. Take Parmenides' One. It is no unity-in-difference but pure undifferentiated unity. For all diversity for Parmenides is
the "path of untruth" and not the "path of truth."B When one speaks of a
being or a thing instead of Being, one speaks of what seems and not of
what is, in the view of Parmenides. So in the case of the Parmenidean One,
there can be no question of its being a unity-in-difference. For to be many is
in the first instance to be illusory. One cannot speak either of the many
being included in the One or of the One being included in the many if in
the first place the many are not. And one can only speak of one thing's
being the measure of the other if they are distinct.
As for Plotinus' ineffable One, it too is undifferentiated unity. That is
why it is called "the One." The One is cause of the unity of all things just
because it is unity pure and simple. 9 Says Plotinus, "It is because nothing is
in the One that everything comes from it. Thus, in order that being be, it is
necessary that the One itself be, not being, but that which begets being."'o
Thus, being is an emanation of the One rather than being part of the One.
When Plotinus says that the parts of the universe are all of them in the
One," the 'in' here is not to be taken as expressing a relation of parts to a
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whole. It is rather to be taken as expressing the relation of effects to
ground, as, for example, we say that the fruit is in the flower. Otherwise,
the One is not undifferentiated unity that begets multiplicity and being.
Moreover, so far from being a free creation of the One, being is a necessary
emanation of the One, as, in Spinoza, modes are necessary effects of
Substance. But the difference is that while in Spinoza modes are always
included in Substance, in Plotinus emanations or beings are viewed as
being distinct effects or creations of the One. Emanations of the One are
effects of the One and are no more part of the One than the world is part of
the Hebraic-Christian God. Thus, the Plotinian One stands between
Spinoza's Substance and the Hebraic-Christian God. Like the former but
unlike the latter, the One's effects necessarily flow from it. But like the latter and unlike the former, the One is distinct from those effects.
In any case, with Plotinus, determinate kinds of being are Platonic
Ideas and they are found, as are ideas of individuals, not in the One but
in Nous, the first emanation of the One. But this means that the One of
Plotinus is no more a unity-in-difference like Hegel's Absolute than is the
One of Parmenides. Rather is it more like the Absolute of Schelling's
third and fourth periods which Hegel characterized as "the night in
which all cows are black."12 But just for that reason, neither one of these
Ones is identified with the fourth thing that, according to PA', is the
unity-in-difference that is here required.
Besides, the One is the source of all Ideas, according to Plotinus. But if,
as he holds, Ideas are self-predicating, then Truth is true. Not only that, but
nothing is truer than Truth, says PlotinusY And this means that truth is
found primarily in Truth and secondarily in the exemplifications of Truth.
But since our fourth thing that is behind the truth of statements, natural
things and events is also the only thing that is preeminently true, it follows
that it is not identified with the Plotinian One but, if anything, with the
Idea of Truth. But this will not do either. For like all Ideas, the Idea of
Truth in Plotinus is caused by the One and our fourth thing is uncaused.
Otherwise, if a thing has truth the way it has being, our fourth thing ends
up being derivatively rather than preeminently true.
Nor is Plato's Idea of the Good a more promising candidate. The Good
is in some respects the precursor of Plotinus' One. As the latter is not a
being but beyond, above and the source of all beings, so too, Plato's Good
is beyond, above and the source of all Ideas, including the Idea of Truth.
It does not include Ideas as parts, attributes or moments any more than
the One includes Ideas as its parts, attributes or moments. It is, says
Plato, to objects of knowledge (Ideas) and to knowing them what the sun
is to visible objects and seeing them. This analogy implies that the Ideas
are no more real constituents of the Good than visible objects are constituents of the sun. Thus, like Plotinus' One, Plato's Good transcends
and causes, but does not include, Ideas. Instead, Ideas include it. If you
go to define anyone of the Ideas, you must ultimately bring in the definition the super-Idea of the Good. That this is not easy (or even possible)
to do is perhaps the deepest reason why Socrates' attempted definitions
in the dialogues remain incomplete.
Besides, if anything is preeminently true in Plato it is the Idea of Truth
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and not the Good. For what could be truer than Truth itself? It may be by
virtue of the Good that Truth or any other Idea is one and intelligible but
Truth is true by virtue of itself. But if so, then that to which 'true' primarily
applies is not the Good, but, if anything, the Idea of Truth. But once again
as in the case of Plotinus, this will not do either since the Idea of Truth is no
ultimate measure. For it is itself measured by the Good. For Truth Itself to
be the fourth thing behind our analogates and so preeminently true, Truth
Itself must be ultimate and unconditioned and this it is not in the philosophies of Plato and Plotinus.
As candidate for our fourth thing, Plotinus' Nous has something the
One and the Good lack. For Nous is a unity-in-difference. For Plotinus, all
Ideas are and must be included in Nous or Intelligence. 14 This is no aggregate or accidental unity but a genuine or organic unity. Ideas are in Nous
as my bodily organs are in me. Though they are all distinct, they share in
the common life of Intelligence just as my different organs share in my
life. 15 This, of course, raises a difficulty as to how the Ideas remain distinct
in Nous when according to Plotinus knowing and known, in Nous, are
identical. 1" If Nous eternally knows Horseness and Humanity and its
knowing these objects is identical with them, how do Horseness and
Humanity remain distinct Ideas?
Be that as it may, though, Nous has something else going for it. It
escapes the circle that disqualifies Spinozistic Substance, the Hegelian
Absolute or any other all-inclusive ultimate. Unlike them, Nous is unity-indifference without being all-inclusive unity or the whole-of-reality. For
Nous is not so wide as to catch the One. As was said, Nous actually
includes Ideas. But Nous does not include the One in the same sense of
'include.' Not being, therefore, all-inclusive whole-of-reality, Nous escapes
that circle, to which previous reference was made, in which something is
measure of itself.
But despite these advantages, Nous comes up short. The trouble with
Nous is the same trouble that excludes the Idea of Truth. Nous is not ultimate but is caused by something else, namely, the One. To that extent,
Nous is secondary and not primary reality. True, it is the first emanation
of the One but a first emanation is nonetheless an emanation. So once
again, if something has truth the way it has reality, then truth in the primary sense is not found in Nous.

v
Evidently, then, the fourth thing by reference to which statements natural things and events in ST', OT' and LT' are called true must be 1), measure
and not measured and 2), unity-in-difference and 3), preeminent reality
that is not the whole-of-reality. What satisfies these conditions? What
qualifies as the fourth thing that is behind the three analogates in objective
truth as we are behind the three analogates in subjective truth?
One thing that does is Aquinas' God. 17 As the source of truth in OT', ST"
and LT', Aquinas' God meets all three conditions. To take OT' first, natural
things are called true, says Aquinas, only because they conform to truth in
God's intellect, just as artefacts are called true only because they conform
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to truth in our intellect. The many Ideas in God's intellect after which natural things are patterned correspond to the models in the artisan's mind
after which artefacts are made. Each intellect, ours and God's, is thus a
unity-in-difference. Not only that, but God's intellect is measure and not
measured in producing natural things just as, in fabricating artistic creations, the artist is measure and not measured. Thus, OT' on the objective
side parallels PT' on the subjective side. The difference is that God is in no
sense measured while human artisans, though they measure their artefacts,
are in other respects measured. And just to the extent that Aquinas' God is
unmeasured measure and also distinct from the world It measures, It is
preeminent reality without being the-whole-of-reality.
Aquinas' God satisfies the same three conditions in ST' truth. According
to Aquinas, God is behind ST' truth. This may not at first seem to be the
case. For facts in the world are the measure of the truth of statements and
judgments, even in the view of Aquinas. 'Grass is green' is true just
because grass is green. Yet, as it exists eternally in the mind of God, the fact
that grass is green is a truth. And this truth is the measure of the fact in the
world and not the other way around. God knows grass is green not
because grass is green but grass is green because God knows grass is
green. Otherwise, God's knowledge is measured by facts in the world. So
while not denying that on one level our statements are made true by facts
in the world, Aquinas holds that, on a deeper level, the truth of statements
is ultimately measured by a timeless truth in the mind of God. And just to
that extent statements and judgments are improperly and secondarily true.
They are called true derivatively speaking, i.e., only because they conform
to truth in something else. And that something else is God. 'K This is not to
deny that, from another standpoint, judgments, at least, are also properly
speaking true. Anything that is not called true only because it is related to
truth in something else is properly speaking true. And in Aquinas' view
judgments are not called true only because they are related to truth in
something else. They are also called true because they correspond to facts
in the world. And to the extent that they do, they are properly or straightforwardly true. For since facts are beings and not truths,19 judgments that
are called true because they correspond to facts are not called true because
they are related to truth. And so they are not to that extent called true
derivatively. Yet, even here judgments are secondarily, if properly, true
since their truth is measured by something else, namely, facts.
From this it is clear that, as source of truth in ST', Aquinas' God satisfies
the three conditions that have been specified. To the extent that many
truths subsist in God as unmeasured measure of the truths in our intellect,
Aquinas' God is a unity-in-difference that is unmeasured measure. And
since, for Aquinas, the truth of judgment that is here measured is something distinct from and not part of God, the latter is not only unmeasured
unity-in-difference but also unidentified with the whole-of-reality.
Finally, Aquinas' God satisfies the same three conditions in LT' truth.
For in the view of Aquinas, God is behind LT' truth just as He is behind
OT' and ST' truth. He believed that law is a kind of plan or design directing
things to an end. As such, law is primarily in minds. Thus, the actions of
citizens are directed to their appropriate ends by an overall plan or design
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of the state in the mind of the governor. And this political plan or design is
a kind of conventional law. But there are also natural laws. These laws are
not made by humans and they direct the activities of natural things to their
ends. Thus, a plan or law of nature in a fetus directs the activities of the
fetus to its end, a fully-developed human being. But like the plan or law of '
the governor, the law of nature of the fetus or of any other natural thing is
primarily in mind and secondarily in matter. As the law of a governor is
found primarily in the governor's mind and secondarily in the actions of
obedient citizens, so too, a natural law is found primarily in God's mind
and secondarily in the conforming activities of a natural object such as a
fetus. That is why Aquinas says that natural law is just the expression of
the eternal law in God. And so it is that law, for Aquinas, is both transcendent and immanent, transcendent in its primary sense in mind and immanent in a secondary sense in the natural things and activities that follow the
law of mind.
Here again, as source of truth in LT', Aquinas' God meets our three conditions. To the extent that many laws subsist in God as unmeasured measure of the activities in natural things that conform to them, Aquinas' God
is unity-in-difference that is measure without being measured. And since,
for Aquinas, the measured natural activities are distinct and not part of
their measuring source, the latter, God, is not only unmeasured unity-indifference but also (as in OT' and ST') unmeasured unity-in-difference that
is unidentified with the whole-of-reality.
But right here it may be objected that the natural laws of Aquinas are
teleological. But everyone knows that, beginning with Galileo, purposive
natural laws were abandoned in favor of the quantitative natural laws of
modern science. But if, since Galileo, natural laws are mathematical formulae expressing relations of uniformity either within or between things
instead of being prearranged plans directing the repetitious behavior of
things, then it is unnecessary to posit a transcendent mind as the source of
natural uniformity. If natural laws are not to begin with plans, there is no
need of a cosmic planner. But then the source of LT' truth need not be God.
But the answer to this objection is that it is simply irrelevant. Whether or
not there are teleological natural laws makes no difference to our argument. To review that argument, in ST', OT' and LT' 'true' is predicated analogically of statements, things and activities, respectively. For these analogates are called true partly in the same sense and partly in a different
sense. But if so, then PA' must be invoked. And according to PA', there
must be a single fourth thing behind these analogates on account of which
they are called true and in which truth is primarily found. And it is on that
fourth thing that the three analogates depend for their essence and existence. Recall Aristotle's example. Because quality, quantity and activity are
called being analogically, there is a fourth thing on account of which they
are called being and on which they depend for what they are and for the
fact that they are. And this is substance. Therefore, just because truth is
found analogically in ST', OT' and LT', it follows by PA' both that there is
some measure of that truth in which truth is primarily found and that the
three analogates depend on that measure both to be and to be what they
are. Since this measure of truth is true in the primary sense, it is unmea-
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sured truth. This is shown by the fact that, while it is included in the definition of the truth of its analogates, the truth of its analogates is not included
in its truth, any more than the being of quality, quantity or activity is
included in the being of substance. Moreover, just because it is included in
its analogates, making them what they are, and the latter, being different
things, have different kinds of measures, our single fourth thing includes
three kinds of archetypes. It is thus a unity-in-difference. Yet, to avoid the
circle of something being measure of itself, it is unity-in-difference that,
though unmeasured, is unidentified with the whole-of-reality. And it is
evident that the foregoing argument stands or falls independently of
whether 'natural law' in LT' is construed teleologically or not.
A second objection is that the simplicity of God is compromised if
truths, Ideas and laws are included in God as specific measures of statements, things and events. To this, Aquinas replies that Ideas (and, by
extension, truths and laws) are in God not as likenesses by which He understands but as that which is understood by Him.2o In other words, to say
Ideas, truths and laws are in God is just to say that God knows Himself.
And since God knows perfectly, God knows Himself in all the ways in
which He is knowable, including being known as imitable by creatures.
Since, therefore, by saying many Ideas, truths and laws are in God is meant
nothing else but that God knows Himself as participable by creatures, then
saying that many Ideas, truths and laws are in God is not inconsistent with
affirming that God is simple.
Finally, the specific measures in objective truth (Le., Ideas, truths and
laws) are final causes, just as are the three measures in subjective truth.
This follows from their being pre-existing standards in God just as, in MT',
PT' and CT', beliefs, models and conventional rules are pre-existing standards in us. For a final cause has the nature of a pre-existing plan, model
or law in mind after which something is made, occurs or is done. But this
exactly fits the description of what Aquinas calls a divine exemplar, be it
an exemplar as Idea or an exemplar as law. And such exemplars are in the
view of Aquinas final causes of all things and activities in the world. 21
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